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Creators/Authors contains: "Stark, Philip B"

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  1. U.S. elections rely heavily on computers such as voter registration databases, electronic pollbooks, voting machines, scanners, tabulators, and results reporting websites. These introduce digital threats to election outcomes. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) mitigate threats to some of these systems by manually inspecting random samples of ballot cards. RLAs have a large chance of correcting wrong outcomes (by conducting a full manual tabulation of a trustworthy record of the votes), but can save labor when reported outcomes are correct. This efficiency is eroded when sampling cannot be targeted to ballot cards that contain the contest(s) under audit. If the sample is drawn from all cast cards, then RLA sample sizes scale like the reciprocal of the fraction of ballot cards that contain the contest(s) under audit. That fraction shrinks as the number of cards per ballot grows (i.e., when elections contain more contests) and as the fraction of ballots that contain the contest decreases (i.e., when a smaller percentage of voters are eligible to vote in the contest). States that conduct RLAs of contests on multi-card ballots or RLAs of small contests can dramatically reduce sample sizes by using information about which ballot cards contain which contests—by keeping track of card-style data (CSD). For instance, CSD reduce the expected number of draws needed to audit a single countywide contest on a 4-card ballot by 75%. Similarly, CSD reduce the expected number of draws by 95% or more for an audit of two contests with the same margin on a 4-card ballot if one contest is on every ballot and the other is on 10% of ballots. In realistic examples, the savings can be several orders of magnitude. 
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  2. The “job talk” is a standard element of faculty recruiting. How audiences treat candidates for faculty positions during job talks could have disparate impact on protected groups, including women. We annotated 156 job talks from five engineering and science departments for 13 categories of questions and comments. All departments were ranked in the top 10 by US News & World Report. We find that differences in the number, nature, and total duration of audience questions and comments are neither material nor statistically significant. For instance, the median difference (by gender) in the duration of questioning ranges from zero to less than two minutes in the five departments. Moreover, in some departments, candidates who were interrupted more often were more likely to be offered a position, challenging the premise that interruptions are necessarily prejudicial. These results are specific to the departments and years covered by the data, but they are broadly consistent with previous research, which found differences comparable in magnitude. However, those studies concluded that the (small) differences were statistically significant. We present evidence that the nominal statistical significance is an artifact of using inappropriate hypothesis tests. We show that it is possible to calibrate those tests to obtain a properP-value using randomization. 
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